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THE WORLD BANK AT THE MILLENNIUM*
Joseph E. Stiglitz
In the aftermath of World War II and in the wake of the Great Depression
(surely one of the underlying causes of the war itself),^ the countries of the
world created three international institutions designed to facilitate economic
cooperation: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (IBRD). GATT (which has since evolved into the
World Trade Organisation) was to work on lowering trade barriers among
nations and on preventing the beggar-thy-neighbour trade policies that were
seen as a contributing factor to the breadth and depth of the Great Depres-
sion. The IMF was to provide liquidity and to sustain the international
payments system (the gold standard that was reinstituted after the War). And
the IBRD, known more generally as the World Bank, was primarily to facilitate
the reconstruction of war-damaged Europe, and then to reach beyond that to
aid in the development of what later became known as the Third World.^
It is now more than fifty years since the creation of these institutions. Over
that half-century, they have evolved enormously, especially in response to
changing economic circumstances and changing needs. The 1971 abandon-
ment of the gold standard by the United States (and subsequently by the rest
of the world) clearly necessitated a change in the functioning and perhaps in
the very role of the IMF. The collapse of the Soviet Union posed a new set of
challenges to the international institutions - namely facilitating the transition
of the former Communist countries to a market economy. The fiftieth anni-
versary of the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) was marked
by criticism from a vocal international group dedicated to the notion that 'Fifty
Years Is Enough', reflecting a view among certain groups that these institutions
had done as least as much or more harm than good. As the World Bank has
* The views presented here are solely those of the author and not those of any institution with which
he is or has heen affiliated. The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments and assistance
of Halsey Rogers and Maya Tudor.
' The link between economic well being and social and political stability had clearly heen of concern
to Keynes, one of the key founders of the Bretton Woods institutions. Recall his The Economic
Consequences of the Peace (1920), in which with clairvoyant insight he saw the dangers of the adverse
consequences of the reparations payments being imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty. We
have, unfortunately, been reminded of this link over the past year. One of the most severe economic
downturns of the postwar period is the depression that has fallen upon Indonesia, where output in
1998 is projected to be 16% below its 1997 level (which itself was dampened by the crisis which began in
October 1997). It is somewhat ironic that the Indonesian depression was in no small measure caused by
the social and political upheaval, itself induced in part by contractionary monetary and fiscal policies
that had already reinforced the economic downturn that followed the currency and financial sector
cnses.
2 The first 'development' loan was given to Belgium, to help the Congo. See Kapur et al. (1997), p.
98.
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worked over the past few years to redefine itself, that cry is heard much less
often today. Similarly, in spite of considerable hesitancy and a lively debate
over the IMF's role and competence, the U.S. Congress did increase its
funding, perhaps in the recognition that if the IMF did not exist, it would have
to be reinvented.
As the world moves into the next century, it is appropriate to re-examine
how these institutions are and should be evolving. I shall focus my remarks
especially on the World Bank, but I shall look at that institution through the
broader perspective of the global economic architecture. And I shall look at
these institutions through the lens of modern public finance, macroeco-
nomics, and development theory.
1. Global Public Goods and the Theory of Market Failures
The Bretton Woods organisations are public institutions, designed to facilitate
collective action at the global level. At the time the Bretton Woods institutions
were founded, there was not as clear a concept of the role of collective action
as there is today. Still, Keynes and his compatriots grasped the notion that
there were imperfections of capital markets that might impede the flow of
capital, say from more to less developed countries. Keynes and his contempor-
aries were keenly aware that market economies do not always work well—
indeed, the Great Depression can be viewed as the most massive market failure
that the world had experienced since the beginning of capitalism. He demon-
strated how appropriate government intervention could help the economy
pull out of an economic downturn. While at the time his ideas were viewed as
radical, they were in a sense very conservative, for they maintained a faith in
the market economy: beyond maintaining overall macroeconomic stability,
government did not have to play any role in resource allocation. Thus, even at
the founding of these institutions, there was a curious blend of a recognition
of a massive market failure and a faith both in markets and government—or at
least in the ability of government to effectively address the key market failures.
Since Keynes, the intellectual foundations of that belief have been subject to
extensive scrutiny. Economic fluctuations in general (and the Great Depression
in particular) are the tip of an iceberg, the most dramatic manifestations of the
market failures that are pervasive in the economy.^ But while we have come to
recognise that markets are not generally even constrained Pareto-efficient,"*
•' For an articulation of this view, see Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987). While it was widely recognised
that Samuelson's neoclassical synthesis, arguing that once macroeconomic problems were solved,
markets provided an efficient resource allocation, lacked foundations, another strand of thought (real
business cycle and new classical theory) tried to develop a consistent intellectual framework by arguing
that markets worked efficiently all the time. To be sure, there were economic fluctuations, but these
were the efficient market responses to external shocks. While employment did vary, it was only because
individuals chose to enjoy more leisure at certain times (like recessions), in response to these changing
economic circumstances.
'' The general theorem is articulated in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986), who show that when
information is imperfect and markets incomplete—that is, essentially always—there exist interventions
in the market which respect these limitations and which can make some individuals better off without
making anyone else worse off.
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there has also grown a greater recognition of the limitations of government.^
Government and markets are seen today more as complements, each providing
a check on, and facilitating the functioning of, the other.^ The recent failures in
Russia have brought home forcefully the importance of the institutional infra-
structure required to make markets work. This includes having appropriate
legal and financial institutions, ensuring competition and contract enforce-
ment, providing for bankrxiptcy, and enhancing the safety and soundness of
hanks. At the same time, public institutions have also made more extensive use
of market mechanisms.
The modern analysis of collective action thus begins with a discussion of
market failures, but then moves on to consider whether public interventions
can improve matters, and how those interventions can best be designed. It
recognises the presence of agency problems in both the public and the private
sector.^
We are concerned here with collective actions, and therefore with market
failures, at the global level. Here, the concept of global public goods is
essential. Following Samuelson's definition of the concept of public goods (in
1954), it became clear that the benefits of some public goods extended only
within a limited geographic region. There thus developed a theory of local
public goods.^ More recently, it has become clear that there are public goods
whose benefits extend well beyond national borders to the global level. These
are global public goods.^ Five major examples have been discussed in the
literature: economic coordination, environment, knowledge, international
security, and humanitarian assistance. Various international institutions have
been created to facilitate collective action in each of these areas. As these five
public goods overlap to some degree, not surprisingly, so do the mandates of
the institutions, a theme to which I shall return later in this essay.
In analysing the evolving role of each of the Bretton Woods institutions, it is
necessary to identify their core mission and the market and/or public failure
that necessitates collective action at the global level. Why, for instance, might
non-cooperative action lead to Pareto-inferior outcomes?
Answering the latter question might not be as easy as it seems. Standard neo-
classical theory, for instance, argues that it is in the interests of each country to
adopt a policy of free trade: what is sometimes referred to as a policy of
unilateral disarmament is a Nash equilibrium. But there is considerable
evidence that GATT and WTO have played a central role in moving the world
towards a freer trade regime (though they have been more successful in
reducing tariffs on manufacturing goods, of concern to more industrialised
countries, than in removing trade barriers in agriculture, the comparative
advantage of parts of the less developed world). To understand that role, one
^ For a general articulation of this view, see Stiglitz (1989).
^ This view has been put forward, e.g. by Hellman et al. (1997), Aoki et al. (1997) and World Bank
(1997c).
' See Stiglitz (1991), Krueger (1987), Shleifer and Vishney (1994), Edlin and Stiglitz (1995).
* Eor early discussions, see, for instance, Tiebout (1956) and Stiglitz (1977 and 1983).
' See Stiglitz (1995) and the Economic Report of the President (1997) and Stiglitz (1999) UNDP paper.
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has to move beyond the neoclassical model. But once one does that, a concern
for intellectual consistency should make one wary of returning to that same
model in analysing trade policies more generally.
Understanding the non-cooperative equilibrium is important in identifying
the kinds of interventions that are likely to be desirable at the international
level. For instance, McKibbin (1988) concludes his analysis of the role of
international macroeconomic coordination in a context in which countries
face inflationary pressures by saying:
A comparison of policies under cooperation and non-cooperation clearly
shows that the non-cooperative equilibrium is contractionary relative to
the cooperative equilibrium.
If that is correct, then international cooperative action should attempt to
induce countries to take more expansionary policies than they would of their
own ^^
2. Core Mission
Today, the World Bank's core mission remains the promotion of economic
growth and the eradication of poverty in the less developed countries. The
instruments used to pursue that objective have changed over the years, to be
sure. Over the Bank's history, the balance of its effort has shifted from large-
scale, growth-oriented projects toward projects, programmes, and policy advice
that more explicidy incorporate the poverty reduction goal. Individual projects
remain the core of the Bank's work, and many of these projects have been
shown to be quite successful at reducing poverty and its effects, whether by
reducing severe malnutrition in Tamil Nadu, India or by helping spur a
dramatic increase in girls' education in Bangladesh.^^
But the Bank has learned over the years that successful projects are not
enough: because of fungibility of funds, the net benefit from financing any
individual project is in fact the net benefit of the marginal government
project— whether Bank-supported or not. Recognition of that fact has led the
Bank to an increased focus on whether, taken as a whole, the government's
actions and the institutional environment support the goal of poverty reduc-
tion. Decisions on the overall lending portfolios for the poorer countries (those
eligible for subsidised IDA loans) are increasingly based on indicators of
macroeconomic and sectoral policies and institutions, as well as governance,
because these variables are strong predictors of performance on poverty
reduction. And poverty assessments now underlie virtually all of the periodic
Country Assistance Strategies that guide our lending programme in each
country. It is largely the increasing availability of poverty data, a result of
'" Interestingly, this view seemed to predominate in the early days of the Bank, when the Bank's
shareholders were reluctant to provide funds for Belgium, partly because of its exclusively contractionary
monetary policy. See Kapur et al. (1997), p. 98.
" See World Bank (1999) for a detailed review of Bank efforts and performance on poverty
reduction.
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household surveys often supported by the Bank, that has helped make that
shift pos-sible.'^
Even as the Bank has pursued and refined its mission of long-term economic
development and poverty reduction however, it has increasingly focused on a
multitude of other issues. It has become more involved in post-conflict
situations, for example, helping countries recover as they emerge from years of
civil war. And as the world has turned its attention to global environmental
issues, the Bank has not only integrated these concerns into its development
agenda (for example, through mandatory environmental assessments of its
projects), but has actively promoted work on specific issues. For instance, the
World Bank has addressed concerns about greenhouse gases through the
Global Environment Facility^^ and through promoting 'carbon trading'.^^ At
the same time, the Bank has also been involved in a number of 'bail-out'
packages, which have had the effect of providing liquidity support to countries
in crisis.
The core mission of IMF continues to be quite distinct: stabilisation, both of
the monetary system and of the world economy in general. Like the World
Bank, the Fund too has evolved over time, especially in its assistance to the
countries in transition and to less developed countries, in its Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) programme.
2.1. Governance
An understanding of the precise roles that these international economic
institutions ought to play should reflect an understanding of the market failures
that need addressing at an international level—a topic to which most of this
essay is directed. But as a preface, let me note that to assess the actual
functioning of these institutions and their ability to fulfill ideal roles, it is
necessary to understand the governance of these institutions. As we noted,
modern approaches to the economics of the public sector focus not only on
market failures, but also on the capacity of political institutions to address
those failures. While the Bretton Woods institutions are political institutions,
they are not directly but indirectly accountable to the peoples of the world
through the representatives of their governments (the executive directors). In
fact, the institutions are not even directly accountable to the chief executives
of their 'shareholder' countries:'^ the IMF is accountable to ministries of
finance and central banks, while the World Bank is accountable to ministries
'^  In Africa, for example, virtually every country has by now carried out at least one such survey, and
most have done so within the past five years (World Bank, 1999).
'^  Which helps pay for incremental costs associated with environmentally beneficial projects.
'•* It has been exploring the creation of a Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF), which would facilitate
carbon trading at the global level under the Clean Development Mechanism and could be expanded to
incorporate trading in emission permits.
' ' Voting rights in these international institutions are markedly different from in the United Nations,
where, in the General Assembly, each country gets a single vote, regardless of its size. In the IMF and
the World Bank, voting rights are proportional to the contributions of the countries that support those
institutions, which, in turn, are related to their GDP. Thus, the United States has the largest 'vote'.
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of finance and either aid agencies (in the case of donor countries) or
economic ministries (in the case of recipient countries). Democratic account-
ability has heen further weakened as central banks have increasingly succeeded
in achieving greater independence, often with the encouragement of the IMF
The World Bank's broad mission of promoting development requires it to
work actively with a large number of ministries in each developing country—
on environment, labour markets, health, education, judicial systems. This in
turn necessitates it taking into account a wide range of perspectives. This has
become even more true in recent years, as views of development have changed
from a more narrow focus on solving certain technical problems, like lowering
tariffs, to a broader one of the transformation of society.^^ In response, the
World Bank has attempted to engage not only all of these ministries, but also
civil society (which in many cases has proven to be an important agent for
change).
Differences in governance structures and in borrowing-country counterparts
clearly affect the policy prescriptions offered by the two institutions. Different
agencies (and the constituencies they represent, or with which they are most
closely affiliated) have different priorities, and those priorities will show up
most glaringly when it becomes necessary to make hard choices. Central
bankers focus predominandy on stabilisation, or even more narrowly on
containing inflation, arguing that such policies are a precondition for growth.
By contrast, development ministries—not to mention environment and labour
ministries—typically focus on the country's longer-term development, broader
quality-of-life issues, impacts of policies on workers, and more broadly, issues
of equity and sustainability. What is important is ensuring that any major policy
shift be preceded by a full discussion that draws on all of these diverse
viewpoints. ^ ^
2.2. Special Interests vs. National Interests
When I served as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, it was clear
that different agencies in the government serve (and see as their mission
'^  My point here is not to discuss whether there might be advantages that result from independence
to offset the presumed disadvantage arising from weaker democratic accountability, but only to focus
on some of the consequences. Note, however, that while there is some argument that independence leads
to better performance of economies in terms of certain intermediate variables (like inflation), there is
no evidence that in terms of the variables of ultimate concern, output and real incomes, and their
growth variability, that performance is superior. See Alesina and Summers (1993). And even in terms of
the former, questions have been raised. Stiglitz (1998/). Some countries, like India, without indepen-
dence, but a strong anti-inflation consensus, have pursued low inflation policies. On the other hand,
independence of the central bank in Russia has enabled it to pursue a more inflationary policy than the
government might have desired. Independence in countries without democratic institutions raises
further problems: Had the Indonesians been persuaded to have an independent central bank during
the Suharto era, the transition to a more democratically accountable regime might have been even
more difficult.
" For articulations of these views, see Wolfensohn's address to the Annual Meetings of the World
Bank and IMF (Wolfensohn, 1998) and my Prebisch lecture at UNCTAD (Stiglitz, 1998A).
'^  The section below on 'Overlappingjurisdictions' will elaborate on this point.
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serving) different constituencies. Indeed, only at tbe very top is tbere typically
mucb focus on tbe national interest. Special interests are so powerful tbat even
near-Pareto-efficient improvements are frequently blocked.'^ Democratic pro-
cesses witbin countries resolve tbese conflicts, attempting to find policies tbat
accommodate different interests and tbereby reacb broad consensus. Witbout
sucb consensus, policies will often not be sustainable. Tbey will be undone
witb tbe next cbange of political winds and, even wbile tbey are in effect, tbey
will not yield full benefits simply because of tbe uncertainty tbat arises from
political vicissitudes.
It sbould not be surprising tben tbat any international economic agency
reporting to central banks and finance ministries reflects tbe views and
interests of tbose agencies and tbeir constituencies more tban it does tbe views
and interests of otbers. Many central banks do not seek to acbieve equitable
representation on tbeir boards, and wbile tbey may claim tbat tbey bear in
mind tbe overall economic interests of tbe country, tbey may face tradeoffs in
wbicb different groups bear tbe risks and reap tbe benefits associated witb
different policies. Labour unions, financial institutions, and business firms
may all look at tbose tradeoffs differently (in American parlance, workers.
Main Street, and Wall Street may eacb bave different views). Indeed, even
tecbnical matters—probability judgments—tbat cannot be cleanly separated
out as forming Bayesian probabilities requires tbe specification of a loss
function, and eacb group bas a different loss function.^"
Tbere are tbus real risks associated witb delegating excessive power to
international economic agencies, and a real cballenge involved in making
tbese institutions take positions tbat are more reflective of stances tbat migbt
bave evolved if tbey were indeed more democratically accountable. Essential to
tbis democratic accountability is increased transparency and increased public
discussion of tbe positions and policies of tbese institutions. Tbe World Bank
is committed to pursuing policies of increased transparency and public
dialogue, not only witbin tbe developing countries witb wbicb it deals, but also
in its own operations.
Agency problems arise at several levels. Not only may an institution not serve
tbe general interest and weigb tbe welfare or perspectives of certain groups more
tban otbers, but tbe institution can actually become an interest group itself,
concerned witb maintaining its position and enbancing its power. Tbis
problem becomes particularly alarming wben tbe power and prestige of an
international organisation is pitted against tbe weak position of a developing
country tbat is appealing to tbe international community in a time of crisis.
Like any prudent lender, international institutions bave an obligation to see
tbat tbeir funds are not squandered and will be repaid. Usually, repayment is
not so mucb at issue as enforcing international codes of conduct: democracies
do not like to see international institutions, wbicb tbey created and support,
being used to prop up corrupt regimes tbat immiserate tbeir citizens. But in
'9 Stiglitz (1997*).
2° Stiglitz (1998/ g-).
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both cases, there are elements of judgment calls—^what reforms are necessary
to ensure, or increase the likelihood of recovery? What reforms could be
postponed? What refonns should be postponed?^' Where does one cross the
line, with both the reforms themselves and the manner in which they are
forced upon the country, undermining democratic processes and ideals?^^
Asymmetries of information make it difficult to curtail agency problems.
When a particular prescription fails, the doctor always has an incentive to
suggest that it was the patients' fault for not following the prescription
precisely. One sometimes hears the defence of failed policies that 'the policies
were correct, but the implementation was faulty'. But modern medicine has
taken upon itself recognition of these 'implementation' problems. Doctors are
aware of human fallibility, of systematic problems—such as patients' inability
to follow a difficult regimen over a long period of time—and have worked out
ways that enhance the likelihood of success (for example, by looking for pills
that need to be taken less often). To suggest that the policy of financial or
capital market liberalisation would have worked, if only the government had
had adequate regulatory institutions, misses the point that few developing
countries have such institutions and that those weaknesses should have been
addressed prior to the deregulation. To put it another way, consider a traffic
analogy. When a single car has an accident on the road, one is inclined to
blame the driver or his car; when there a dozens of accidents at the same spot
however, the presumption changes. It is likely that something is wrong with
the design of the road. The fact that there have been, by some reckonings,
financial crises in 100 countries in the past quarter-century suggests that there
are systematic problems.^^
My point here is not an exegesis of the most recent set of crises, or even
more broadly, of the policies which might have led to them. Rather, my intent
is to point out that those who advocated those policies have an incentive to
'^ For instance, consider what would have happened if the United States had undertaken a thorough
reform of its preferential taxation of real estate and its misguided agricultural policies in the midst of
the S&L crisis in 1989. Clearly, these were distortionary policies that not only interfered with the overall
efficiency of the economy, but also were directly related to the real estate boom at the root of the crisis.
Yet had those policies been reformed during the crisis, the collapse of a small but important segment of
the U.S. financial system would have overtaken the entire system. As a result, one effect of that
collapse—the recession of 1991—2— w^ould almost undoubtedly been far more severe. Timing of
reforms is critical, and the midst of a crisis was clearly the wrong time for those reforms.
^^  Feldstein (1998) argues that many of the conditions imposed on Korea by the IMF in the bailout
of December 1997 crossed that line. For instance, whether or the extent to which the Central Bank
should be independent, and whether its exclusive mandate should be the maintenance of price stability,
are hotly contested propositions even among economists. They are ultimately political decisions.
Indeed, in the United States, when Senator Mack proposed changing the charter of the Federal Reserve
Board from its current broad mandate, which includes 'maximum employment, stable prices, and
moderate long-term interest rates' (Board of Governors, 1994) to an exclusive focus on price stability, I
and others in the Clinton Administration had little trouble convincing the President that, should the
Senator pursue in advocating this change, the issue should be made a central one in the upcoming
election. The threat sufficed to bury the proposal. Korea did not have a history of inflation, such as
might warrant inclusion of such a major political reform as a condition for receiving assistance.
^ Caprio and Klingebiel (1997). For more extensive discussion of these issues, see World Bank
(19986) and Furman and Stiglitz (1998).
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defend them as appropriate, as well as an incentive to argue that any apparent
failures are the fault not of the policies, but of those who implemented them.^ "*
It is important to recognise these potentially perverse incentives, for they
suggest that the policy framework generally, and the policy prescriptions
individually, may be maintained longer than the 'evidence' would suggest is
reasonable.^^
2.3. Transparency
Public scrutiny serves a useful function in limiting the distortions and abuses
that arise from agency problems at every level. Such public scrutiny is especially
important for the international financial institutions, for several reasons. First,
in the services they provide, these institutions are monopolists or near-mono-
polists. Market discipline thus cannot provide its usual check. Even if an
institution developed a bad reputation and was often thought to misdiagnose
problems, it might be turned to in a time of crisis simply because it was the
only game in town. Second, the natural asymmetries of information are large:
few outside the institutions and the affected governments^^ have the up-to-the
minute knowledge required to assess the accuracy of the diagnosis or the
likelihood of success of the therapy. Third, the magnitude of the asymmetries
of information is endogenous. There is an especial danger: the institutions
recognise their 'market power' in the flow of information, and there will
therefore be strong pressures on and within the various international agencies
to 'collude' to restrict the flow of information, and in particular, information
that might be interpreted as critical of one another.^^ (Indeed, as in other
arenas, collusion is facilitated by the need for cooperation and by procedures
designed to check some of the natural rivalries that might exist between the
organisations.) Finally, as we have noted, the governance structure is such that
there is not broad-based accountability.
Natural proclivities for secrecy^® in the public sector generally are only
reinforced by the cultures of the governing ministries and the markets from
which they draw many of their key personnel. Central banks have had a long
tradition of secrecy, which is only now slowly changing. In financial markets,
'•'•' See Stiglitz (1998d).
^ The tendency of managers with failing projects to delay abandoning them has long been noted in
the organisational literature, which has referred to the phenomenon as 'escalating commitment'. The
phenomenon appeared puzzling to economists, who repeated the maxim that bygones should be
treated as bygones: previous investments should be treated as sunk costs. At each moment, the issue
should be, what is the best policy going forward. But the economists' naive reasoning ignored the
agency problem: the manager's personal reputation was at stake. See Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
Staw(1981).
^^  One other group typically does have considerable knowledge—the lenders who are part of the
bail-out—but they have obvious vested interests.
^ What may be at stake is not so much the reputation of the institution or agency as a whole, but of
particular individuals who have been influential in making the decisions. These individuals have, of
course, an incentive to make it seem that what is at stake is not their own personal reputation, but that
of the institution.
*^ See Stiglitz (1998o) for a discussion of some of the incentives for secrecy at play within public
agencies, and the conflict between public and private interests.
© Royal Economic Society 1999
F586 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [NOVEMBER
knowledge may be the key not only to power, but, more importantly, to
money—the real currency of the realm. There are those who argue that public
discussions will roil the market; yet there have been no studies demonstrating
this and no evidence that the policies of more complete disclosure, such as
those recently instituted by the Bank of England, have had any adverse effects
on market stability. Moreover, even if there were a conflict or tradeoff between
openness and democratic accountability on the one hand and a slight increase
in market volatility on the other, it is not apparent to me that such a conflict
should be automatically resolved in favour of the markets. Recent emphases
on the importance of transparency suggest that there is a widespread belief
that greater transparency will actually enhance the functioning of the mar-
kets.^^ In general, I suspect that markets respond more readily to fundamen-
tals than to the pronouncements of international bureaucrats, and an
increased flow of information should reduce the importance of any particular
piece of information. Specifically, it is especially hard to believe that analyses
of actions taken in the beginning of a crisis would have much impact weeks
later. The standards of disclosure should be at least up to those of the Freedom
of Information Acts of the countries with the greatest degree of democratic
accountability, with confidentiality exceptions spelled out clearly, and with
public debate on these exceptions.
2.4. Organisational Checks
While the most important check on agency problems is that provided by public
scrutiny, well-managed organisations, aware of these difficulties, can and do
design complementary internal checks. The World Bank has several. One of
the functions of the Development Economics Center (which is also responsible
for conducting research) is to comment on the policies and practices being
pursued by the Bank's operations. What is their development impact? To what
extent are funds fungible? To what extent does the loan change the way
resources are being allocated? Can the project be designed in a way that
enables us to extract broadly applicable lessons? Will the country be better off
after the loan, enough better off to compensate for the greater burden of
debt?
Another group, the Operations Evaluation Department, is devoted to
evaluating the Bank's projects. This group reports directly to the Board, and in
that way obviates some of the agency problems that would arise if it reported to
the Bank's management, whose performance itjudges.
The Bank also relies heavily on outsiders—for example, through peer review
of its research proposals, an Inspection Panel which independently evaluates
whether the Bank has abided by its own chartered policies and procedures,
and so forth.
^' It is of course, possible that there may be some hypocrisy in these stances. For a more extended
discussion of the relationship between transparency and economic performance, and a discussion of
the political economy of transparency, see World Bank (1997<;), Kaufmann et al. (1998) and Furnian
and Stiglitz (1998).
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The questions posed by these various groups are often uncomfortable, but
the internal scrutiny serves the organisation, and development more broadly,
well.
3. Adapting to a Changing World
While the broad mandate of the World Bank has not changed in recent
decades, the way in which it works to accomplish that mandate has changed. In
this part of the paper, I want to trace out how changes in the global economy,
as well as new perspectives on development, have led to changes in both what
the Bank does and how it does it.
3.1. New Views of Development
Views about development have changed in the Bank, as they have in the
development community more broadly. Today, there is a concern about
broader objectives, entailing more instruments, than was the case
earlier.^^Development is concerned not only with increasing GDP, but also
with raising living standards more broadly. It is concerned with democratic,
equitable, and sustainable development.^^ Development is seen as a transfor-
mation of society: a dual economy is not a developed economy, and many of
the earlier strategies did little to promote this broader transformation of
society. It is true that earlier strategies diverged markedly in their views
concerning the role of the state: they varied from the planning approaches
that characterised development strategies within the Bank while Hollis Chen-
ery served as Chief Economist, to the focus on trade liberalisation and
privatisation in the years in which Anne Krueger served in that same capacity,
and later to the emphasis on macro-stability as a series of macroeconomists
held the position. What all of these approaches had in common was a belief
that solving certain technical problems to achieve a more efficient allocation
of resources was the key to successful development.^^ But successful develop-
ment requires not only addressing these technical issues, but a transformation
that puts educational and political development at its centre.
Indeed, there has been considerable questioning of earlier strategies even in
their more narrow definitions. While the development strategies of the last
twenty years have focused on market-based reforms,^^ they have often failed to
'" See Stiglitz (1998(i).
" This broader agenda often brings the Bank beyond the traditional domains of economic analysis.
There has been some concern whether in doing so the Bank is going beyond its charter, which
proscribed it from entering into politics. But it has increasingly become recognised that issues like
corruption, transparency and democratic processes have profound effects both on development and
poverty. See, for instance. Knack and Keefer (1997), Sen (1997) and World Bank (1997a).
'^ For a brief discussion of these different positions, see Stiglitz, (1997a).
' ' It is clear that the prescriptions that came to be called the Washington Consensus are not
sufficient for development, since many countries that followed the precepts have still failed to achieve
even moderate levels of growth. Beyond this, there is even a question whether they are necessary for
successful development. China, which is by all accounts the most successful of the low-income countries
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establish the institutional infrastructure required to make markets work.
Economic theory emphasised that to make markets work, both the competi-
tion and the incentives provided by private property are necessary. The
emphasis on one over the other was not based on any body of theory or
evidence. The contrast between the experiences of China and Russia has raised
questions about the refonn strategy emphasising privatisation over competi-
tion: China focused on competition, and saw its per capita GDP increase
almost eight-fold in two decades; Russia ignored competition policy, and, even
after privatisations and other reforms that were supposed to improve effi-
ciency, saw its output decline markedly. Moreover, privatisations in many
countries that did not accompany those changes with effective regulatory and
competition policies showed that while private monopolies could more effi-
ciently exploit consumers than could the public monopolies they were replac-
ing, privatisation did not necessarily lead to either lower prices or much
greater market access. East Asia demonstrated that successful development was
possible, but its leading economies adopted economic policies that differed in
several key respects from the orthodoxy often advocated by the international
financial institutions.^^ And the East Asia crisis has reinforced the message that
weak financial institutions can be as disruptive to macroeconomic stability as
can high levels of infiation.
Thus, the broadening of objectives and instruments has necessitated both
developing new competencies and re-examining old strategies. What separates
more developed from less developed countries is not only a scarcity of capital,
but a disparity in knowledge. Bridging the knowledge gap has thus become
central to the Bank's strategy (World Bank, 1998a, b). Less developed countries
differ from more developed countries in part because their market institutions
that work less effectively. Development strategies must be based on an under-
standing of why markets do not function well. And while they should work to
enhance the effectiveness of market institutions, public policy will be badly
misguided if it does not take into account the limitations of markets. Govern-
ment plays a vital role in providing the underlying institutional infrastructure
required to make markets work well. Thus, increasing the effectiveness of the
state at the same time that one focuses attention on its basic roles is central to
development strategies.^^ All of these changes are based on advances in under-
standing of economics, including the revolutionary changes presented by
information economics and the integration of modern finance into the main
corpus of economic thought.
and which accounted in aggregate for two-thirds of the entire increase in incomes among the low-
income countries between 1978 and 1995, did nol follow many of the key precepts of the Washington
consensus. For further discussion on the Washington Consensus, see Williamson (1990). Throughout
this paper, I have in mind a somewhat different conception of the Washington consensus than the one
originally outlined by my colleague John Williamson (1990), who coined the term. As Williamson
(1997) himself notes, the term has evolved over time to signify a set of 'neoliberal' policy prescriptions,
rather than the more descriptive usage that he originally intended in discussing reforms undertaken by
Latin American economies in the 1980s.
^'^ See World Bank (1993) and Stiglitz (1996).
'^ See World Bank (1997a, 1998*).
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3.2. Changing Markets
Changes in the world we deal with have also forced changes in what the Bank
does and how it does it. In particular, globalisation—the marked expansion in
global markets for goods and capital—has had a profound effect on the World
Bank and other international institutions associated with global economic
policy. We noted that the World Bank was founded partly on the presumption
that capital markets are imperfect, and that without the role of government,
there would be insufficient flows of capital from the more to the less developed
countries. The World Bank borrowed in international capital markets and
relent the money to needy member countries. The high credit rating of the
World Bank enabled these countries to tap into the global capital markets at
more favourable terms than they could on their own. Presumably, either there
were market irrationalities that led private lenders to charge excessively high
interest rates, or else the World Bank was more effective in enforcing contracts
than were private lenders (or both). In either case, the World Bank repre-
sented an improvement in the functioning of capital markets.
The huge increase in the flow of private capital to emerging markets - with
long-term flows increasing from less than $50 billion in 1990 to almost $250
billion in 1996 and $290 billion in 1997 - raised the spectre that these capital
market imperfections might have been overcome. Indeed, by early 1997 many
countries had access at terms comparable to those offered by the World Bank.
Even then, however, it was clear that there were large gaps: most low-income
countries, especially in Africa, did not have access to international capital
markets; funds flowed freely only to a few select countries.^^ And funds were
not going to all sectors, but went disproportionately to finance infrastructure
projects from which cost recovery was possible. Other sectors that were equally
important for successful development, such as health and education, received
almost no private funds.
Within the World Bank, this changing marketplace led to a redirection of
lending, to those sectors and those countries that did not have easy access to
the market—that is, wherever the impediments to the flow of capital seemed
to remain important. The Bank increasingly asked itself how could it work
more effectively to complement the market, for example by offering credit
guarantees that would leverage its limited resources. In recent months, it has
been involved in several such credit enhancements.^^ The Bank is in effect
testing whether the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies to these transactions, by
assessing whether its actions have indeed reduced the market imperfections or
have simply led to a repackaging of the risk.
The events of 1997 and 1998 raised, however, some profound questions
about some of these large private capital flows. The instability of the flows
imposed enormous costs on the recipient countries. While foreign direct
'^ While South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa together received only 6% of FDI and 12% of the
aggregate net resource flows to all developing countries, the East Asia region received 44% of FDI and
34% of the aggregate net resource flows. See World Bank (1998e).
" Examples from 1998 include credit guarantees for a repo facility in Argentina and for a power
plant in Thailand.
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investment remained relatively stable, the reversals of short-term flows were
both sudden and enormous (amounting in East Asia to over 10% of GDP). At
a time when countercyclical investment would have been desirable, private
finance for infrastructure projects was cancelled. There thus appeared to be a
continuing countercyclical role for the Bank even in this area and in those
countries where the private sector had been of increasing importance. The
experience in this and previous crises showed that in periods not only of crisis,
but also of economic slowdown, the net flow of private funds may quickly be
withdrawn from developing countries, often exacerbating their economic
weaknesses. The international institutions have a clear role to play in offsetting
these destabilising forces of private capital markets.
Changes in global capital markets and changes in views of development
interacted to lead to a shift in the focus of activities within the bank. While the
Bank has continued to be a major source of capital (with outstanding loans
totaling $106 billion in 1998, plus an additional $51 billion committed but not
yet disbursed) ,^ ^ it has increasingly thought of itself as a Knowledge Bank.^^
Knowledge, it will be recalled, is one of the central international public goods.
The accumulation, processing, and dissemination of knowledge in develop-
ment, as well as working more broadly to close the knowledge gap, is the
special responsibility of the World Bank.
The two activities of the Bank are complementary. Knowledge, particularly
knowledge about the institutions and policies that make market economies
work better, leads to higher returns and better allocation of capital. Recent
research at the World Bank^ *^  has shown that in countries pursuing sound
economic policies and good economic institutions—more than half of the
developing countries, encompassing a much larger share of the population—
development assistance is highly effective in promoting growth. Receiving
assistance equal to 1% of GDP increases growth by 0.5%, reduces poverty by
1%, and increases private capital flows by 1.9% of GDP.
The World Bank has a role to play in providing such advice that extends
beyond the public-good nature of knowledge. It is, and is widely perceived to
be, an honest broker.*^ There is always a concern that there may be a conflict
of interest in the private provision of such information—that a private consult-
ing firm may recommend, for instance, provisions of a telecom bill that benefit
the firm's other consulting clients more than they do the country itself.
'* See World Bank (1998c).
' ' See World Bank president James Wolfensohn's 1996 address to the Bank/Fund Annual Meedngs
in Washington (Wolfensohn, 1996). Fora more extended discussion of the concept of knowledge as an
international public good, and the role of the World Bank as a Knowledge Bank, see World Bank
(1998*) and Sdglitz (1998c) and the references cited there.
'"' World Bank (1998 a).
In fulfilling this role, its multinational nature is important. It does not, for instance, represent the
interests of the telecommunications company of any particular country.
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3.3. Dealing with the Country
The changing, broader view of development has necessitated a change in the
way in which the Bank interacts with developing-country borrowers. In the
past, international agencies typically insisted on a large list of 'conditions' in
return for the provision of funds. On the one hand, these conditions could be
thought of as part of the loan contract, just as a private lender imposes
conditions the use of funds and covenants that restrict more generally the
behaviour of the borrower. But the conditionalities imposed often were quite
broad. This was especially true of the structural adjustment loans, which
provided funds for overall budgetary and balance of payments support rather
than for the financing of a particular project. The conditions negotiated with
the country often entailed trade liberalisation, privatisation, and macroeco-
nomic stability—all the elements that were central to the Washington consen-
sus reforms. There has been an extensive discussion of this conditionality:
whether the mandated reforms were the right reforms, whether they were
introduced at the right pace and with the right sequencing, whether reformers
paid adequate attention to the more difficult reforms associated with establish-
ing the institutional infrastructure of a market economy, whether the reforms
themselves went beyond issues of economics into politics,*^ and whether the
imposition of so many conditions,'*^ seemingly without prioritisation, tended
to weaken country focus.'''* But these questions are not my concern here. There
is a more fundamental issue: was imposing conditionality an effective way of
changing policies? There is increasing evidence that it was not—good policies
cannot be bought, at least in a sustainable way.''^  Equally critically, there is a
concern that the way that the changes were effected undermined democratic
processes.
As we go forward, the Bank will increasingly work with each borrowing
country to develop a broad development strategy. Like a corporate strategy, it
would serve as a vision of where the economy is going and what needs to be
done to get there. The Bank would then ascertain where within that strategy it
has a role. The focus of the Bank will be on capacity-building and consensus-
building: helping the country develop the capacity (including think tanks and
research institutions) to formulate its own development strategy and demo-
cratic institutions to arrive at a national consensus about those strategies.
Our approach has changed along with our understanding. In recent years,
the Bank has increasingly recognised that funds are largely fungible, and that
the limited funds it has available cannot by themselves make much of a dent
on development. As a result, the Bank has focused increasingly on using its
funds as 'leverage'. It does this in various ways: financing projects that can be
••2 See, for instance, Feldstein (1997).
•" On this point, see, for instance, Sachs (1996). Overloading the agenda is of especial concern in
those countries with limited institutional capacities. Indeed, there have been complaints that the
inordinate amount of time that key government officials have had to spend negotiating these
conditionalities reduced the amount of time they had available for engaging in constructive develop-
ment efforts.
•*' See in particular, Stiglitz (1998c).
^^ World Bank (1998 a).
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scaled up, so that the learning from successful projects can be transferred both
within and between countries; using financing to help create an environment
which attracts private capital; and helping to assess the overall expenditure
programme and development strategy of the country, rather than just indivi-
dual projects.
4. Overlapping Jurisdictions
The recent crises have brought to the fore the overlaps in the mandates of
various international institutions, and especially of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, as illustrated by the call for the Bank to help
provide liquidity support. Issues of overlapping jurisdictions have long been a
source of concern—and indeed seemed to have been a worry even at the time
that the institutions were created, when some suggested that the duties of the
Bank and the Fund should be assigned to a single institution.''^
Before describing the framework within which the two institutions seek to
work together, let me say that such overlapping of jurisdictions does not
bother me: the two institutions have different mandates, different foci, and
different structures of governance. The Bank, as I have noted, focuses on long-
run development, the Fund on stabilisation. Given these differences, it is not
surprising that occasionally there may be major differences in views concern-
ing economic policy. What may be good for stabilisation today may hinder
long-term development. The design of economic policy represents a balancing
of concerns, and it is up to the country to make the political decisions about
how the various risks are to be balanced. These are not just technical matters
to be left to international bureaucrats, as competent as they may be. And it is
important that there be more than one source of opinion, of information, of
advice. The benefits of a diversity of viewpoints outweigh the costs of the
occasional confusion they engender. Resolving—not suppressing—conflicting
views is an essential part of democratic processes. These alternative sources of
information provide an important check, especially given the lack of direct
democratic accountability.
The recent crises in Asia and elsewhere serve as a pointed reminder of the
importance of this kind of dialogue. Clearly, the policy responses to those
crises had huge distributional consequences. The countries could have
adopted other policies that, if not Pareto-dominating, at least would have
imposed less risks on some groups (though perhaps more on others) than did
the policies that actually were undertaken. Such tradeoffs are again political;
economic advisers should simply provide the information about the nature of
the tradeoffs and the risks.''^ This is especially true in those arenas where there
is not agreement among economists about the consequences of particular
policies. There were many economists who warned, for instance, of the
dangers of excessively rapid financial market liberalisation in countries that
•"* Mason (1973).
•" This viewpoint was put forward forcefully by John Neville Keynes more than eighty years ago See
Keynes (1917).
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lacked the appropriate regulatory structures. In retrospect, there is now a
growing consensus that that advice should have been heeded. Should the
countries have been confronted with these alternative views, leaving it up to
them to make the decision, rather than imposing such reforms as a condition
for receiving aid?
An essential part of the transformation that is called development or
modernisation is the spread of scientific reasoning—^which distinguishes be-
tween evidence and ideology and which recognises the limitations of our
knowledge and the high degree of uncertainty associated with many of our
beliefs. Pretending that there is certainty where there is none is not only
dangerous, but may itself set back the development agenda.
The Bank and the Fund have on several occasions worked toward an accord
that delineates more clearly their areas of responsibility. Given the Fund's
focus on stabilisation, it is natural that it has taken a large responsibility for
macroeconomic issues; given the Bank's responsibility for development, it is
natural that it should take primary responsibility for structural or micro-
economic issues. But the delineation is far from sharp. Issues of macroeco-
nomics and microeconomics are intertwined, as evidenced so clearly in the
most recent crisis. It was weak financial institutions and lack of trans-
parency"*^—structural issues lying within the Bank's domain of responsibility—
that were assigned much of the blame for the crisis and that underlay the
macroeconomic weaknesses.
But it is not only at the onset of the crisis that structural issues have
macroeconomic consequences: the pace and design of corporate and financial
restructuring has strong aggregate consequences. A policy of forcing countries
to meet excessively stringent capital adequacy standards in too short a period
of time may lead to a credit crunch that undermines the economic recovery,
and—by increasing the incidence of bankruptcy—may actually be self-defeat-
ing. At the same time, the conduct of macro policy clearly affects the ability to
pursue structural reform: the difficulties of restructuring weak financial institu-
tions in the midst of depression, when firms are going bankrupt by the droves,
should be apparent.
Thus, the two institutions, although they differ in their areas of focus and
core missions, have important areas of overlapping concern where cooperative
action is required. However, the two institutions do not always speak with one
voice, which is not surprising given the differences in mandates and govern-
ance structure discussed earlier. To some, this is disturbing: there is presum-
ably only one truth, and the international institutions should be leading the
less developed countries toward that truth! But to me, open discussion when
there is a lack of agreement seems healthy. We should not pretend that there
is more certainty about the policies being advocated than the evidence
warrants, and disagreements between the institutions reflect both differences
in interpretations of the evidence (including differences in models) and
differences in objectives.
••^  Though there is some controversy even over this diagnosis. See Furman and Stiglitz (1998).
© Royal Economic Society 1999
F594 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [NOVEMBER
Ultimately, if we believe in democratic processes, the countries must make
the decisions for themselves, and the responsibility of economic advisers is
only to apprise them of prevailing views concerning those consequences. We
do a disservice in pretending that there is more consensus on these matters
than there actually is. Moreover, given the weaknesses in the checks on the
international institutions, whether through market discipline or direct demo-
cratic governance, it is all the more important that different voices be heard.
To be sure, the different voices may give rise to a vigorous democratic debate,
which may be uncomfortable to those wishing to ensure that their views
prevail, but that is one of the 'prices' we pay for democracy.
More recently, the Bank has been called upon to participate in a large
number of bailout programmes. While the Bank's charter clearly provides for
extending emergency assistance—there is a consensus that such lending poses
the danger of diverting the Bank from its core mission.^^ The main reason it
has been called upon in these circumstances seems to be that the crisis
countries have needed more funding than is available through the IMF. But if
the international community believes that liquidity support through bailout
packages is effective and desirable, there seems a compelling case that the
community should provide sufficient financing to the institution responsible
for carrying out this mandate—rather than diverting the funds and focus of
other institutions away from their core missions. Still, in supporting the
packages in East Asia, the Bank has worked hard to ensure that its support is
directed at areas within its central mandate: helping these countries' long-term
growth and development strategies and trying to limit the soaring poverty that
has accompanied the economic collapses. Thus, while the Fund has tried to
encourage short-term borrowing for adjustment and recovery, the Bank has
designed its lending programme for a long-term engagement with the country,
because it recognises that, for instance, corporate and financial restructuring
cannot be done overnight. The Bank has focused on these restructuring issues,
as well as issues of corporate and public governance and the development of
stronger safety nets. In Thailand, where weaknesses in infrastructure and
education were apparent as impediments to its long-term growth even before
the crisis, the Bank has continued to support programmes in these areas.
While the Bank's programmes in these countries lie well within its core
mission, it has responded to the crisis by designing programmes and providing
funds far more rapidly than would normally be the case.
5. Concluding Comments
The past fifty years has shown that development is possible, but not inevitable.
If development were easy, there would have been more success stories. As the
world enters the next millennium, the challenges facing the World Bank, in its
core mission of promoting growth and reducing poverty, remain as great as
"•^  See, for example, James Wolfensohn's address to the 1998 Annual Meetings of the Bank and Fund
(Wolfensohn, 1998).
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ever. While there has been great progress in reducing poverty, continuing
population growth makes the struggle an uphill one: there are now more
people living in poverty than there were fifty years ago.^" East Asia shows both
the potential for success and the fragility of that success. While in the 1970s, it
is estimated that 6 out of 10 East Asians lived in absolute poverty (defined as
income of under US$1 per day), by the mid-1990s, that number had been
reduced to 2 out of 10. But as a result of the recent crisis, the World Bank
estimates that the number of people living in poverty in the region will double,
from 30 million to 60 million.^^
The Bank will thus have a mission well into the coming millennium. This
would be true even if capital market imperfections were eliminated and capital
and financial markets behaved far more stably than they have over the course
of the previous two centuries. To be sure, what the Bank does and how it does
it will undoubtedly evolve with the continuing changes in the global environ-
ment and in our understanding of development—that is, both our views of its
objectives and our beliefs about how they can most effectively be accom-
plished. We have, for instance, learned much from the experiences in reform,
from both successes and failures. There is a greater recognition of the
importance of the institutional infrastructure that is required to make markets
work, of the importance of competition, of the key role that governments play,
and of the necessity of strengthening the capacity of governments to perform
those roles. Deficiencies in the models of the economy which underlay much
past advice have become apparent, and new and more appropriate models
have been developed; hopefully, the advice proffered will reflect these new
perspectives.
That there will be further evolution in the way that the Bank approaches its
core mission seems clear, as greater clarity is achieved on the market failures
that give rise to a need for public action and on public failures and the ways to
mitigate them.
Over the long run, the success of the Bank will depend on its ability to
maintain its focus on the broader role of international institutions: addressing
the needs for collective action at a global level.
The World Bank
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